Non-international armed conflicts in Pakistan
The government of Pakistan is involved in non-international armed conflicts with various armed groups acting throughout its territory, particularly Taliban-affiliated groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and independence fighters in Balochistan.
There are multiple and overlapping armed conflicts in Pakistan. The conflicts have also spilled over into Afghanistan.
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In 2002, Pakistan began conducting military operations against foreign fighters hiding in its tribal areas. In response to these attacks, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan group (TTP) formed out of veterans of armed conflicts in neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan, and local tribal groups.
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In 2004, Pakistan began launching military offensives against fighters believed to be affiliated to al-Qaeda in the tribal areas near its Afghan border. The United States simultaneously began targeting suspected al-Qaeda members in the same area through drone strikes. Further offensives were launched in subsequent years. In 2014, Pakistan launched a ‘counter-terrorism’ operation, Zarb-e-Azb, against various non-state armed groups.
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In parallel, armed groups are fighting the government over independence of the province of Balochistan.
Two criteria need to be assessed in order to answer the question whether a situation of armed violence amounts to a non-international armed conflict.
- First, the level of armed violence must reach a certain degree of intensity that goes beyond internal disturbances and tensions.
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Second, in every non-international armed conflict, at least one side to the conflict must be a non-state armed group which must exhibit a certain level of organization in order to qualify as a party to the non-international armed conflict. Government forces are presumed to satisfy the criteria of organization.
Intensity of violence
Various indicative factors are used to assess whether a given situation has met the required intensity threshold, such as the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the types of weapons and military equipment used; the number of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; the number of civilians fleeing; and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council.
Armed clashes and attacks take place in various regions of Pakistan, including its tribal areas and major cities such as Islamabad and Lahore. While attacks and armed clashes dropped in number in 2015, they still occur regularly and have on occasion caused big numbers of casualties. For example, between January and April 2017, dozens of armed clashes were reported in several districts. Similarly, during the last years several thousand fighters of armed groups and several hundred Pakistani soldiers were reportedly killed.
Clashes have continued in 2020. For instance, on 7 January 2020 militant reportedly affiliated with Pakistani Taliban killed two police officers in Karachi; on 9 March, Pakistani Taliban clashed with soldiers in North Waziristan, causing the death of four members of the armed forces. In April 2020, tensions further increased as violence continued, and the government came under heavy criticism due to its response to COVID-19 pandemic. The situation worsened in October, when opposition groups engaged in a number of sustained armed attacks against state forces, and continued escalating closer to the local elections, which took place in February 2021.
By 2014, nearly 1 million persons newly displaced by the conflict were registered by Pakistani authorities, resulting in nearly two million displaced persons in total. The number has since been reduced, with people being able to return to their homes in parts of the country. However, an estimated 464,000 people continue to be internally displaced by on-going violence and conflict.
In 2021 violence has remained intense, and it has not given signs of improvement in 2022. In September 2021, Pakistani Taliban have conducted a number of attacks against Pakistani armed forces. In November 2021, the government reached a ceasefire agreement with the Pakistani Taliban group. Nevertheless, the agreement did not put an end to fighting and a few attacks were conducted by the rebels against state forces, to the point that the ceasefire ended in December 2021. In 2022, the situation deteriorated and violence significantly increased, especially between the government and the Pakistani Taliban.
In May 2022, the Afghan government brokered peace talks between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani government.
Spill-over in Afghanistan and short-lived IACs between Pakistan and Afghanistan
The conflicts in Pakistan have also spilled over into Afghanistan. Amongst others, splinter groups of the Pakistani Taliban allegedly joined ranks with the Afghan Taliban and use Pakistani territory as a safe haven from which to participate in the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan.
In August 2022, following the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban took control over the country and became the new government. In October 2021, border skirmishes took place between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the Taliban government accused Pakistan to implement restriction on transit of goods and people between the two countries. Tensions between the two countries persisted over the following months, as Pakistani Taliban launched attacks against Pakistani state forces from Afghanistan.
On 16 April 2022, Pakistan launched an airstrike against Afghanistan, which resulted in civilian casualties in Kunar and Khost provinces. Furthermore, on 8 and 22 August 2022 Pakistani and Afghan troops clashed across the border.
Organization of the armed groups
A series of indicative factors are used to assess whether armed groups exhibit the required degree of organization, such as the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms, the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms, the ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, the ability to negotiate and conclude agreements, e.g. cease fire or peace agreements. If the criterion of a minimum organization of the armed group is not fulfilled, there is no armed conflict.
Attacks in Pakistan are claimed by a variety of armed groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army , the Khorasan Branch of the Islamic State group (IS-K), , Jamaat-ur-Ahrar , or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi .
The Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an umbrella group reuniting some of these groups and cooperating with others. Despite being a relatively loose structure composed of various smaller armed groups, the TTP reportedly has an official common leadership, a central spokesperson and a common public relations policy. However, this structure has at times been called into question by internal division, fracturing and voluntary surrenders of high ranking members. Still, attacks continue being carried out in the name of the TTP. The TTP have claimed or carried out some of the most notorious and large-scale attacks, such as the Peshawar school attack in 2014 , the attack at Bacha Khan University , and the Karachi airport attack , which illustrates their operational capacity.
At times, the TTP has controlled territory in Pakistan’s tribal areas. It has been controlling the Swat Valley for a number of years. Reportedly, the TTP created both underground tunnel systems and IED-preparation factories. The TTP has claimed responsibility for attacks in neighbouring countries, such as a 2009 attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan.
The TTP’s organisational structure is further illustrated by its ability to enter peace talks with the Pakistani government. Moreover, it gives interviews to media. It has released videos showing its armed activities.
Some fractions have broken away from the TTP, such as Jamaat-e-Ahrar (or Jamaat-ul-Ahrar), who took over some of the TTP structure. They have carried out a considerable number of attacks, including some of the deadliest attacks in recent years. Other high-level attacks are being attributed to the group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
A number of different groups are operating in Pakistan and their relationships are not always clear. Shifting alliances and affiliations, in-fighting and collaborations have been reported. The Haqqani Network, for instance, has both been reported to fight alongside the TTP, but also for the Pakistani government and the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda appears to have strong links with the TTP, but the exact degree of involvement is difficult to ascertain. Similarly, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has been reported to have ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group.
United States drone strikes
The United States began conducting drone strikes against suspected al-Qaeda members in Pakistan’s tribal areas in 2004. Drone strikes have also been targeting other groups in Pakistan, namely the Afghan Taliban , the Pakistan Taliban TTP , and the Haqqani Network. The U.S. has also sent forces into Pakistan, notably in 2011 when al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed. Moreover, the U.S. has reportedly killed top commanders of the TTP.
Two issues are raised by the U.S. drone strikes for the classification of armed conflicts.
First, the question arises whether carrying out drone strikes on Pakistani territory without the Pakistani government’s consent leads to an international armed conflict. While the U.S. intervention generally seems to be tolerated by Pakistan, at times the Pakistani government has objected to it or called it a violation of the state’s sovereignty, especially for strikes outside the tribal areas. However, according to some reports, the Pakistani government only publicly objects to the drone strikes, but privately acquiesces to them or even cooperates. The Pakistani position is inconsistent over time and among different government entities. Neither the U.S. nor Pakistan seems to consider that the strikes have triggered a conflict between the two states. While the ambiguous attitude of Pakistan on the drone strikes exemplarily illustrates the difficulty and sensitivity of establishing consent in some situations, overall there appears to be some form of consent.
A second challenge to be addressed is whether the U.S. is involved in a non-international armed conflict in Pakistan. This conclusion could be reached on different grounds. First, the U.S. could be considered a party to the pre-existing non-international armed conflict between the Pakistani government and the TTP and other armed groups. Yet, while this may be the case for strikes which are consented to by the Pakistani government, this approach does not account for all the strikes due to the ambiguity surrounding Pakistani consent. Another argument relates to the blurred boundaries between the non-international armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To the extent that U.S drone strikes are targeting individuals linked to the fighting in Afghanistan, these drone strikes may be considered as part of the spill-over of the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan. However, this approach does not account for all the drone strikes. Finally, the U.S. could be involved in a separate non-international armed conflict against al-Qaeda and/or the TTP and associated groups in Pakistan if the criteria of intensity and degree of organization of the groups are fulfilled. Without specifically referring to Pakistan, the U.S. asserts that it ‘is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces’. Yet, it is questionable whether the requisite degree of intensity is reached. Moreover, the non-state parties to such a conflict are difficult to establish due to the complex nature of the relationship between the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, which are all targets of the U.S. drone strikes. For these reasons, RULAC does not consider that the U.S. is involved in an armed conflict in Pakistan, while acknowledging that some of the drone strikes may be a spill-over from the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan. The lack of transparency concerning drone strikes hinders the assessment whether particular strikes are part of the non-international armed conflict or not.
All parties to the conflict are bound by Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that provides for the minimum standard to be respected and requires humane treatment without adverse distinction of all persons not or no longer taking active parts in hostilities. It prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, hostage taking and unfair trials. In addition, all parties are bound by customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict.
In addition to international humanitarian law, international human rights law continues to apply during times of armed conflict. Under human rights law, the territorial state has an obligation to prevent and to investigate alleged violations, including by non-state actors. Non-state armed groups are increasingly considered to be bound by international human rights law if they exercise de facto control over some areas.
State parties
Non-state parties
A wide array of non-state armed groups is active in Pakistan. Below is a selection of the most important groups or alliances.
- Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP)
- Jamaat-ul-Ahrar
- The Haqqani network
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
- The Baloch Liberation Army
- IS-K
